

Fitting Square Pegs into Round Holes: Atlantic Coast Conference Member Institutional
Responses to NCAA Sanctions, 1986-2016

By Matt Arant

Executive Summary

The current state of college athletics is a popular debate topic among many Americans. Matters of athlete compensation and how large-scale commercialization has undermined traditional notions of academic integrity and genuine amateurism are the most common topics covered, but I decided to shift the conversation from the NCAA as a whole to the individual institutions and conferences that grapple with the same issues. Using the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) from 1986-2016 as a sample, I wanted to both comprehend how specific institutions respond to NCAA sanctions and the way the conference treats previously non-compliant programs when it undergoes expansion efforts. I created a three-pronged criterion for institutional response: senior-level change, lower-level change, or no change. Using my best judgment, alongside a bevy of primary sources, I designated which programs experienced administrative change.

After evaluating all twenty-three cases, clear patterns of violations and sanctions were present. Extra benefits and impermissible recruiting were the most popular form of violations while probation and public reprimand/censure were the most common penalties levied by the NCAA Infractions Committee. However, determining a pattern among institutional responses is much more difficult. Despite the overwhelming number of cases that consisted of some administrative change, the direct link between violations/sanctions and change in leadership were found in only a few instances. High attrition rates are a fact of life for senior-level administrators in both academia and athletics; resignations, retirements, new positions in different locales and firings exist at all universities. The environment often masks this direct link between sanctions and new leadership, a development that should be considered by advocates of athletic reform.

Risky Business at Minardi Hall

In early February, University of Louisville President James Ramsey and Athletic Director Tom Jurich decided to self-impose a one-year postseason ban (both conference and national tournament) for the men's basketball team. On first glance, the judgment issued by Ramsey and Jurich stunned the city and the national college basketball community given Louisville's impressive record this season. However, the nature of the events led officials to make this decision with the hopes of reducing the severity of future punishment (Greer, 2016). In early April, Louisville underwent a second phase of self-punishment when they decided to reduce the number of scholarships and recruiting visits by both coach Rick Pitino and the rest of his staff.

At the heart of this punishment were the allegations made by Katina Powell in which she described "nearly two dozen stripping and sex parties from 2010 to 2014 inside Billy Minardi Hall, the on-campus dorm for athletes and other students." Powell told *Outside the Lines* that Andre McGee, a former Cardinals player who was later promoted to director of basketball operations, coordinated the parties and "paid her \$10,000 for supplying dancers during the time period; McGee also allegedly "supplied cash for 'side deals,' which included sex with some recruits, guardians who accompanied them on visits and some Louisville players." Five former Cardinals players corroborated Powell's account and McGee's role in it (Barr and Goodman, 2015).

College Sports Scandals and Institutional Responses

If these allegations at Louisville are found to be true by the NCAA, then there is no question that additional punishments will be given. However, to those who have followed scandals in college sports, this pattern of bad behavior has largely become routine.

Intercollegiate athletics have been mired with scandal and controversy for decades, but it was the professionalization of coaches that ushered in this era of commercialization. Beginning with Yale crew in 1864, the “saga of the professional coach does much to explode the myth that there was ever a lengthy period when the amateur spirit pervaded college athletics” (Smith 1986, 147). The state of commercialization in college sports has adapted over time, but programs have constantly been looking for ways to gain an advantage over their rivals. In the last decade alone, the NCAA has issued sixty five reports of major violations, with thirty-nine of them coming from schools in “Power Five” conferences (ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12, and SEC).

While so much has been written about the ills of NCAA when it comes to athlete compensation and the plethora of scandals rocking colleges and universities across the country, a dearth of literature has focused on institutional responses to these scandals. Using the Atlantic Coast Conference as an example, I seek to understand the next steps taken by ACC member institutions after the NCAA issues reports detailing specific violations and their accompanied penalties. Furthermore, with conference expansion as the norm rather than the exception, I also will examine new entrants to the ACC over time and determine how conference leadership viewed their prior records of rule breaking and whether this impacted their membership to the conference.

Scapegoats and “Keeping up with the Joneses”: Prior Work on Institutional Reactions to NCAA Sanctions

The primary focus of this paper is to identify potential patterns among institutions in how they respond to NCAA sanctions for rules violations, but it warrants mentioning how scholars perceive NCAA enforcement and how this perception has evolved over time.

NCAA Enforcement in General

Scholars initially examined NCAA enforcement for years through the lens of emphasizing the system's numerous flaws. The potential conflict of interests present between enforcement staff and the NCAA's Infraction Committee, questionable protocols for recording testimony by investigators, the apparent one-sided nature of the flow of information, and lack of sanction consistency were just a few of the issues posed by researchers (Gopelrud, 1991). However, the scope later shifted to studying how NCAA enforcement influences competitive balance in different sports, specifically football. Researchers using panel data from eleven major Division 1 football conferences found that greater levels of enforcement in a conference improve competitive balance but the greater severity of punishment reduces competitive balance, thereby determining that the net effect of enforcement improves competitive balance (Depken and Wilson, 2006).

Despite Depken and Wilson's conclusion of enforcement leading to greater balance among programs, many others posit that the NCAA is guilty of practicing "selective enforcement," a process that "targets the least successful schools for investigation while turning a blind eye to the most successful institutions because they generate a bulk of the national interest, and, therefore, a bulk of the revenue" (Byers quoted in Otto 1995, 40). Yet, others propose another iteration of selective enforcement where the NCAA "goes after the most successful programs because they attract the most media attention; therefore, they are more closely scrutinized" (Zimbalist quoted in Otto 1999, 40).

The aura of confusion and contradiction surrounding NCAA enforcement leads to interesting arguments of due process. This due process argument exists on two planes: the

concept of selective enforcement itself and when the actual sanctions are handed down. Cases of documented wrongdoing by athletic programs take several years to compile. Once the mandates from the Infractions Committee are finally handed down, it adversely impacts athletes who had no involvement with the violations outlined by the committee, creating a retroactive system of punishment.

Scapegoats

Scapegoating is the practice of assigning blame or undeserved negative treatment to one specific individual or group of individuals. Scapegoating occurs in virtually every segment of society, but it occupies a special place when it comes to sports. Hallowed discussion of curses and jinxes surround teams across the country, especially those teams who have not experienced success for a significant amount of time. What should team executives do in this situation? Often, they opt for a change in management by firing a head coach or manager, a development chronicled by William Gamson and Norman Scotch in 1964.

Using Major League Baseball managers as their test subjects, Gamson and Scotch proposed three explanations for the succession-effectiveness relationship initially articulated by Oscar Grusky. The first explanation was designated the common-sense one-way causality theory; essentially, the manager understands that his competence is a chief influencer of team performance. If the team performs poorly, the manager is ultimately held responsible, dismissed, and replaced by another manager with the expectation of raising team performance. Grusky's two-way causality theory also supports the claim that managers greatly influence team performance but with reversed repercussions. A change in management "inevitably upsets old patterns of behavior" and "new organizational policies produce changes of great magnitude in

the internal structure of the team.” Third, the ritual scapegoat no-way causality theory largely discounts the impact a manager has on team performance; rather, the talent on the field is the most important indicator of success (Gamson and Scotch 1964, 69-70). The issue of scapegoating figures largely in assessing institutional responses to NCAA sanctions also.

Whenever a program is found to have committed recruiting violations or academic dishonesty, what is the next step? Do they insulate senior-level officials (head coaches, athletic directors, presidents) from blame and sever ties with tutors, advisors, assistant coaches/recruiters or acknowledge that accountability is a top-down rather than bottom-up approach? Additionally, when these punishments finally go into effect, current players become scapegoats because they are negatively impacted by the sins of their predecessors.

Conspicuous Consumption and “Keeping Up with the Joneses” in College Athletics

The American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen is most famous for coining the phrase “conspicuous consumption,” which is the behavior of spending money on unnecessary luxury goods as a means of displaying apparent affluence (Veblen, 1899). Closely related to conspicuous consumption is the idea of “keeping up with the Joneses,” a phenomenon where comparing financial success with one’s peers was the key measure of social class: failing to “keep up” was (and in most respects, still is) a mark of inferiority. This comparative tool for success has been implemented as a means of motivation for university athletics departments for decades, but only recently has the extravagant spending by programs gained traction and visibility in popular circles.

Will Hobson and Steve Rich at the *Washington Post* requested from athletic departments at all 53 public schools affiliated with “Power Five” conferences financial records for 2004 and

2014 to chart potential trends in athletics department spending. They found that over this ten-year period the combined income of all departments nearly doubled to \$4.5 billion, but twenty-five departments still ran a deficit for 2014. Despite the apparent contradiction of unprecedented revenues coupled with a substantial number of programs “ending up in the red,” Veblen’s theory effectively explains why this is the case. Universities such as Alabama, Texas, Ohio State, and Florida are often lumped together as the “1 Percent” of college athletics, but officials at less lucrative programs compete in arms races for better facilities and high-quality coaches in order to remain competitive with these behemoths. Desire to draw the best recruits and keep the most accomplished athletes eligible is another manifestation of “keeping up with the Joneses” among athletics departments and can lead to considerable consequences such as NCAA sanctions (Hobson and Rich, 2015).

Research Design

In determining how colleges and universities respond to NCAA sanctions for major violations including the improper payment of athletes via monetary/non-monetary benefits and instances of academic fraud, I opted for a qualitative approach of analysis with the goal of identifying patterns among the studied institutions.

Data

I used the NCAA’s Legislative Services Database for major infractions case searches. Dating back to January 1, 1953, this database allows for individuals to search for NCAA reports of major violations by individual school, conference, division, penalty type, and sport (<https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch>). I decided to look at just one “Power Five” conference, the 15-school Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), over a specific time period (1986-

2016). I decided to select the ACC because of its large institutional variance and general academic superiority when compared to similar conferences. Enrollments range from around 6,500 at Duke to 41,000 at Florida State with six members being privately affiliated. Moreover, most of these schools are often regarded as being some of the nation's best. This significant degree of variation may lead to different plans of action by institutions because of their differing missions. However, this intra-conference variation may be overcome by the general characteristics (notably athletic facility budgets and administrative compensation) found among Power Five conference members when compared to non-Power Five conferences, leading to some sense of generalizability.

The year 1986 is crucial in the history of the NCAA because the Supreme Court recently ruled that existing television contracts violated antitrust law. Subsequently, college sports began to commercialize at levels never before seen, and I argue that this shift potentially led to coaches and other members affiliated with athletic departments to engage in behavior at odds with certain NCAA bylaws.

Methodology

After applying parameters for conference and time period to the database, I found that ACC member schools had twenty-three major infractions cases. Due to the tumultuous nature of conference realignment and for the sake of clarity, I am only including current members of the ACC (even if they committed violations while a part of another conference). Because this is a qualitative analysis, I will be initially classifying all twenty-three cases based on school, year, and sport alongside the most "popular" violations committed by the program and penalties imposed by the NCAA. Additionally, I illustrate via primary sources such as media guides how

these individual institutions responded to NCAA sanctions. I have created a set of criteria for classifying institutional response: change in senior-level administration, change in lower-level administration, and accepting the decision and pursuing no further action. Finally, I include which schools committed major violations prior to being admitted to the ACC with the goal of explaining the potential effect committing major violations has on a program looking to “upgrade” conferences. By specifying these schools, I hope to leave readers with a pressing question: how much is a conference willing to sacrifice in terms of academic prestige and integrity for allowing successful and profitable yet delinquent programs into its ranks?

Note on Sources

Because this particular analysis required quite a bit of personal data collection, I consulted available media guides for all ACC member universities that received some NCAA sanction report in the established timeline. This allowed me to determine who the head coaches were at the time of both the alleged violations and release of NCAA sanction reports. If there was a change in leadership, I then cross referenced these names with news articles written at the time which would offer a better indicator of whether recently-issued sanctions contributed to this change. Regarding university presidents, I consulted individual universities’ “Office of the President” webpages which contained lists of past presidents and then conducted the same cross-referencing procedure. For example, the University of Miami following the 1995 NCAA report experienced an administrative shakeup in their football program. Head coaches (two) and athletic directors (two) during the time period of the alleged violations (1985-1994) left the university; some resigned, others took positions elsewhere. In order to effectively determine what specifically led to these changes, I had to consult relevant *Miami Herald* articles. In terms of lower-level changes, the infractions committee directly listed these in the reports because this

was often part of the university's process of self-corrective action prior to the final report being released.

Findings and Discussion

Table 1: Report Breakdown

School	Year	Sport
Clemson	1990, 1992	FB (1990); MBB (1992)
Florida State	1996, 2009	FB (1996); FB, MWBB, MT, Base, MWS, MG, Soft (2009)
Georgia Tech	1989, 2005, 2011, 2014	MT (1989); FB, MWCC, MWT, MWS (2005); MBB, FB (2011); FB, MWBB (2014)
Louisville	1996, 1998	MBB (1996); MBB, VB (1998)
Miami	1995, 2003, 2013	FB, WG, Base, MT (1995); Base (2003); FB, MBB (2013)
North Carolina	2012	FB (2012)
North Carolina State	1989	MBB (1989)
Notre Dame	1999	FB (1999)
Pittsburgh	1993	FB, MBB (1993)
Syracuse	1992, 2015	FB, MWBB, MLax, MWrest (1992); FB, MBB (2015)
Virginia	1993	FB (1993)
Virginia Tech	1987, 1993	FB, MBB (1987); MWCC (1993)
Wake Forest	1994	MBB (1994)

Key: FB=Football, MBB=Men's Basketball, WBB=Women's Basketball, MT=Tennis, WT=Women's Tennis Base=Baseball, MS=Men's Swimming, WS=Women's Swimming, MG= Men's Golf, WG=Women's Golf, Soft=Softball, MCC=Men's Cross Country, WCC=Women's Cross Country, VB=Volleyball, MLax=Men's Lacrosse, MWrest=Men's Wrestling

Table 1 shows just how extensively a major rules violation scandal can plague an athletic conference. During this time period, thirteen of the fifteen member schools committed some type of major rules violation; only Duke and Boston College remained unscathed. Football and men's basketball were the two most penalized sports; of the twenty-three cases, fifteen involved football and thirteen involved men's basketball. This should not come as too big of a surprise when considering the large amount of media exposure devoted to these two particular sports. However, several "non-revenue generating" sports engaged in significant wrongdoing during this time as well, dispelling the common perception that just football and basketball programs take unacceptable liberties with NCAA rules and regulations.

Table 2: Most Popular Violations and NCAA Penalties

Violation	Penalty
1. Extra benefits (16 cases)	1. Probation (21 cases)
2. Impermissible Recruiting (14 cases)	2. Public Reprimand (21 cases)
3. Lack of Institutional Control (9 cases)	3. Compliance Reports (17 cases)
4. Unethical Conduct (8 cases)	4. Scholarship Reduction (15 cases)
5. Improper Financial Aid/ Failure to Monitor (tied with 6 cases)	5. Re-Certification (12 cases)

Table 2 lists the five most frequent types of violations committed by ACC member schools and penalties levied by the NCAA Committee on Infractions. In terms of violations, extra benefits and impermissible recruiting are clearly the most popular over this time period. These two offenses are somewhat related in that it often involves providing athletes with items in

excess of their scholarship and stipend, and this practice may include both prospective and current athletes. Benefits can range from small amounts of cash or gifts to luxurious items such as jewelry, high-end clothing, airfare, fine dining, air travel, or tickets to marquee prizefights. Impermissible recruiting may include offering prospective athletes extra benefits, but this term is more all-encompassing. Illegally contacting recruits via telephone, email, text messaging, or in person as well as being present for “tryouts” or workout sessions with recruits can be classified under this umbrella of improper or impermissible recruiting. While extra benefits and recruiting violations are often committed by lower-level athletics department officials, the other three violations most often cited in the selected NCAA reports (lack of institutional control, unethical conduct, and failure to monitor) carry with them an aura of indicting senior management for negligent behavior. An allegation of failure to monitor or a general lack of institutional control can be construed as an organizational “scarlet letter,” yet this designation does not always yield a head coach or athletic director’s dismissal from the college or university.

The types of penalties levied by the NCAA were pretty uniform; from a possible twenty-three cases, twenty-one required probation (1-5 years) and a public reprimand/censure. It appears that this form of punishment was the actual report itself, with the NCAA making the change in the late 1980s. It bears noting that periodic compliance reports detailing suitable progress being made by departments and reductions of scholarships were required in the overwhelming majority of the cases studied. Re-certification is essentially an accrediting process undertaken by compliant athletic departments every 10 years, but this process may have to be repeated following violations. Finally, highly severe penalties decided by the NCAA such as a postseason ban or vacating of wins or individual records were present in some cases, six and eight respectively.

Now What? Next Steps for Programs

While violations and their successive penalties followed a general pattern at ACC programs from 1986 to the present, it is much more difficult to pinpoint a distinct “playbook” used by schools following the issuing of these sanctions. Higher education administration and intercollegiate athletics are atmospheres rife with high turnover; coaches and athletic directors are fired for lackluster performance, take positions at new institutions with the hopes of “upgrading” his or her situation for not only financial reasons but also enhancing individual reputation, retire, or resign for other reasons. Due to this wide variety of possible changes in leadership, the existence of a definite link between the culpable program and the change in head coach, athletic director, or even university president is tenuous at best. (Table 2 in the Appendix details both senior-level and lower-level administrative change for each case in the 1986-2016 timeframe).

The first three cases from this study (Virginia Tech football and men’s basketball, Georgia Tech men’s tennis, and North Carolina State men’s basketball) offered examples of substantive steps taken by these universities’ athletics departments to prevent future wrongdoing. After allegations of improper employment, academic fraud, and extra benefits, Virginia Tech’s head football coach and athletic director Bill Dooley and head basketball coach Charles Moir resigned from their respective positions. Additionally, university president William Lavery resigned shortly after the report detailing violations was released by the NCAA. A similar chain of events occurred within Georgia Tech’s tennis program with the swift resignation of the team’s head coach and top assistant, and N.C. State’s head men’s basketball coach and athletic director Jim Valvano (of 1983 NCAA championship fame) was forced to relinquish his athletic director duties in 1989 and resigned as head coach the following year. During the late 1980s the national

media began exhaustively chronicling serious abuses occurring in the athletic programs at Kentucky, Maryland, and Oklahoma, so the decision to distance themselves from the leaders of delinquent programs could be viewed as an effective public relations decision (Theelin, 1996).

Yet, some of these departed administrators found new positions almost immediately, even within the same institution. Dooley was named the next head coach at Wake Forest in 1987, Lavery became honorary chancellor and professor of international affairs at Virginia Tech in 1987, and North Carolina State's Chancellor Bruce Poulton led the university's Literacy Systems Center in 1989. Starting in 1990, the pattern of institutional response can be best described as sporadic: some schools made clean breaks with senior athletic officials (North Carolina football in 2010) while others either fled the program for new positions (Miami football in early 1990s) or largely stayed intact (Syracuse men's basketball in late 1980s and currently). Despite the lack of meaningful action at some programs, in the majority of cases lower-level participants in wrongdoing were quickly dismissed as a direct result of their duties at the university; this included not only assistant coaches and members of recruiting staffs but also tutors, academic advisors, and operations assistants. To further understand how universities respond to NCAA scandals, a more in-depth analysis of the nine cases where "lack of institutional control" violations were found is necessary.

The Neglectful Nine

Clemson, Georgia Tech, Louisville, Miami (twice), North Carolina State, Syracuse (twice), and Virginia all were hit with "lack of institutional control" violations, but each program appeared to try different forms of corrective action. With the exception of N.C. State, no head coach, athletic director, or university president at any of these schools either resigned or were

fired as a direct result of NCAA findings of rules violations. However, this does not mean that senior-level administrators remained at their respective schools. Continuing with the widely held description of college athletics as a “dog eat dog” world and how high attrition rates are a fact of life, nearly all of the other eight universities experienced significant changes. For example, the University of Miami was the sight of two particularly shocking scandals: one included school officials fraudulently securing over \$200,000 in Pell Grants for athletes and the other involved the multi-year exploits of Hurricane “super booster” and Ponzi schemer Nevin Shapiro. For the early case, head football coaches Jimmy Johnson and Dennis Erickson left for new positions with the NFL while then-current athletic directors became the General Manager of the New England Patriots and the Director of Sports for the 1996 Olympics, respectively. Syracuse, however, is the notable exception, specifically within its men’s basketball program. Despite two major investigations into alleged academic fraud and extra benefits, the program’s head coach Jim Boeheim has stayed with the school for over forty five years (forty as head coach). One hallmark characteristic of the ACC has been its efforts to expand its conference membership, so this adds another wrinkle to the issue of how different institutions handle reports of NCAA sanctions.

Non-Charter Members and History of NCAA Violations

Founded in 1953, the ACC consisted of eight original members: Clemson, Duke, Maryland (now part of the Big Ten) North Carolina, North Carolina State, South Carolina (now part of the SEC), Virginia, and Wake Forest. Over time, the ACC was caught in the nationwide whirlwind of conference realignment and expansion. Table 3 displays new members of the ACC and their history of violations via conference affiliation at the time of NCAA sanctions.

Table 3: Expansion Members and Violations

School	Conference at Time of Violation
Boston College (2005)	No violations committed in time period
Florida State (1991)	ACC (after admission to conference)
Georgia Tech (1979)	ACC (after admission to conference)
***Louisville (2014)	Metro, Conference USA
***Miami (2004)	Independent/Big East, Big East, ACC
Notre Dame (2013)	Independent
Pittsburgh (2013)	Independent
***Syracuse (2013)	Big East, Big East/ACC
Virginia Tech (2004)	Metro/Independent, Metro

Eight of the nine expansion schools committed NCAA violations over the thirty-year period analyzed, but three in particular deserve special consideration. With the sanctions around Louisville's misconduct still pending, the decision to admit troubled programs such as Syracuse and Miami into the conference is worth discussing. The exploits of Miami's football program are well-documented, but the Hurricanes were highly successful on the field, winning bowl games and national championships and producing large amounts of revenue as a member of the Big East conference (Hurricanes football was independently affiliated prior to 1990). This success made the university a prime target for conference expansion, especially for those conferences that wanted nationally competitive football programs. From performance and revenue generating standpoints, this was a no-brainer; adding Miami to the ACC would easily achieve the conference's goal of being more than just a "basketball conference." Yet, in the years following

Miami's admittance to the ACC, their football program has gone 81-57, a sharp contrast to their 128-29 record in the Big East. The presence of well-established football programs in the ACC such as (also non-charter member) Florida State may have contributed to this decline in success, but this decision to overlook substantive bad behavior by the Hurricanes athletics department and their football team specifically in order to achieve greater conference prestige was a major gamble to take in the eyes of reform-minded administrators.

Furthermore, Syracuse's recent admission to the ACC was a byproduct of the "original" Big East disbanding in 2013. As the vetting process for Syracuse joining the ACC was underway, highly publicized events were taking place in the university's men's basketball program, specifically the eligibility of center Fab Melo. Essentially in 2012 senior officials in the basketball program, including the director of operations, conspired to keep Melo academically eligible during one of Syracuse's most successful years with the hopes of a deep March tournament run. Academic fraud became one of the charges levied against Syracuse in the recently released report of NCAA sanctions, but the events surrounding Melo's eligibility was known to the public at the time of Syracuse's admission to the ACC.

Conclusions and Limitations

The pattern of violations and sanctions is pretty clear from studying the ACC over a thirty-year period. Extra benefits given to recruits and current players and improper recruiting are the most often-cited violations in NCAA reports, but lack of institutional control and failure to monitor also figure prominently throughout this time frame. Probation and regular compliance reports are a couple of the most used sanctions by the NCAA, with postseason bans and vacating wins/records issued less frequently. Despite these apparent patterns, institutional responses have

much more variation. Using my three-outcome model (change in senior-level administration, change in lower-level administration, no change), I found that schools largely vary in how they handle NCAA sanctions. Some schools like North Carolina and North Carolina State swiftly removed all individuals associated with the alleged wrongdoing while schools like Miami or Syracuse either did nothing or underwent administrative change involving coaches or athletic directors taking positions elsewhere and facing no disciplinary action for their role in NCAA violations. The high rate of attrition often masks this concrete effect of NCAA sanctions on job security because most people simply read countless stories of coaches or athletic directors being fired or resigning and fail to look deeper.

Because this is a case study analysis, there exist potential generalizability concerns. Studying the issue of responses to NCAA sanctions through only one conference over one time period makes it difficult for researchers to definitively state a connection between sanctions and administrative change. However, the ACC is a pretty diverse conference in terms of enrollment, geography, and public/private affiliation, so these cases may be better to illustrate the ostensible variation among schools than a more homogenous conference such as the SEC or Big 10. Additionally, the concept of selective enforcement itself may adversely impact the findings of this study because some investigations may not have even taken place, indicating an inconsistency of investigating wrongdoing.

As a senior-level athletic administrator, I would feel at ease with the results provided. Despite the large numbers of cases with administrative change, the number of instances where university presidents, athletic directors, and head coaches were either fired or forced to resign were relatively rare in this sample. Even after some resignations, senior-level administrators were gainfully employed at another institution or another department within the same institution.

Those that face the greatest brunt of sanctions however are the student-athletes who are members of non-compliant programs and lower-level staffers who may have directly committed the violations but whose employment prospects are bleaker than their senior-level counterparts.

References

Barr, John and Jeff Goodman. "Former Louisville recruit about his visit: 'It was like I was in a strip club.'" *ESPN's Outside the Lines* 20 Oct. 2015.

http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/13927159/former-louisville-cardinals-basketball-players-recruits-acknowledge-stripper-parties-minardi-hall

Depken, Craig A. and Dennis P. Wilson. "NCAA Enforcement and Competitive Balance in College Football." *Southern Economic Journal* 72.4 (Apr. 2006): 826-845.

Gamson, William A., and Norman A. Scotch. "Scapegoating in Baseball." *American Journal of Sociology* 70.1 (Jul. 1964): 69-72.

Goplerud, C. Peter III. "NCAA Enforcement Process: A Call for Procedural Fairness." *Capital University Law Review* 20.3 (1991): 543-560.

Greer, Jeff. "U of L imposing postseason hoops ban." *Louisville Courier-Journal* 5 Feb. 2016.

<http://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2016/02/05/sources-u-l-imposing-postseason-hoops-ban/79878760/>

Hobson, Will and Steven Rich. "Playing in the Red." *The Washington Post* 23 Nov. 2015.

Online. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/2015/11/23/running-up-the-bills/>

Otto, K. Alexa. "Major Violations and NCAA Powerhouse Football Programs: What Are the Odds of Being Charged." *Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport* 15.1 (2005): 39-58.

Smith, Ronald A. *Sports and Freedom: The Rise of Big-Time College Athletics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Print.

Theelin, John R. *Games Colleges Play: Scandal and Reform in Intercollegiate Athletics*.

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Print.

Veblen, Thorstein. *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. *Project Gutenberg*, 1899. Online.

Appendix

Table 1: ACC Member Characteristics

School	Location	Year Established	Affiliation	Undergraduate Enrollment
Boston College	Chestnut Hill, MA	1863	Private (Catholic)	14,500
Clemson	Clemson, SC	1889	Public	19,453
Duke	Durham, NC	1838	Private	6,247
Florida State	Tallahassee, FL	1851	Public	41,000
Georgia Tech	Atlanta, GA	1885	Public	19,393
Louisville	Louisville, KY	1798	Public	22,000
Miami	Coral Gables, FL	1925	Private	15,520
North Carolina	Chapel Hill, NC	1789	Public	26,878
North Carolina State	Raleigh, NC	1887	Public	29,957
Notre Dame	South Bend, IN	1842	Private (Catholic)	11,985
Pittsburgh	Pittsburgh, PA	1787	Public	35,330
Syracuse	Syracuse, NY	1870	Private	21,029
Virginia	Charlottesville, VA	1819	Public	20,399
Virginia Tech	Blacksburg, VA	1872	Public	28,000
Wake Forest	Winston-Salem, NC	1834	Private	7,152

**Enrollment figures courtesy of school profile pages on <http://www.theacc.com/> **

Table 2: Institutional Response Criteria

School	Year	Change in Senior-Level Admin	Change in Lower-Level Admin
Clemson	1990, 1992	Y (1990), N (1992)	Y (1990), Y (1992)
Florida State	1996, 2009	Y (1996), Y (2009)	N (1996), Y (2009)
Georgia Tech	1989, 2005, 2011, 2014	Y (1989), Y (2005), Y (2011), N (2014)	Y (1989), N (2005), Y (2011), Y (2014)
Louisville	1996, 1998	Y (1996), N (1998)	Y (1996), Y (1998)
Miami	1995, 2003, 2013	Y (1995), Y (2003), Y (2013)	N (1995), N (2003), N (2013)
North Carolina	2012	Y (2012)	Y (2012)
North Carolina State	1989	Y (1989)	N (1989)
Notre Dame	1999	N (1999)	Y (1999)
Pittsburgh	1993	N (1993)	Y (1993)
Syracuse	1992, 2015	Y (1992), Y (2015)	Y (1992), Y (2015)
Virginia	1993	N (1993)	N (1993)
Virginia Tech	1987, 1993	Y (1987), Y (1993)	N (1987), N (1993)
Wake Forest	1994	N (1994)	Y (1994)

**Note: 16 of 23 cases contained some type of senior-level administrative change; 14 of 23 cases contained some type of lower-level administrative change